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The Wartenberg-Smith Film as Philosophy Debate:  
Review of Current Controversies in Philosophy of Film 
 
The debate around the idea that films can philosophize is relatively recent. It was first 
inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s and Stanley Cavell’s writings on the philosophical 
potential of film. Both philosophers have had significant influence in both analytic and 
continental philosophy. But it was only in the 2000s that this idea received greater 
interest as a topic of philosophy of film, becoming one of its most controversial topics. 
 Thus it was with much excitement that I received news that Current 
Controversies in Philosophy of Film would include one section (Part V) exclusively 
dedicated to the topic, including two chapters (9 and 10) written by two major figures in 
the film as philosophy (FAP) debate, namely the advocate, Thomas E. Wartenberg, and 
the critic, Murray Smith, respectively.  
 The papers in this section present two opposite answers to the question of 
whether films can philosophize, which is indicative of the polemical debate surrounding 
this topic. This contribution is valuable because it delves into the main controversial 
issues, objections, and positions around the topic, making it a great starting point for 
anyone interested in the idea of philosophizing film in the Anglo-American context. 
Chapter 9, written by Thomas E. Wartenberg, one of the major advocates of 
FAP, exposes the main objections to it, and gives a moderate defense through the 
analysis of several films he takes to exemplify cinematic philosophy.  
Wartenberg starts the chapter by briefly addressing what is at issue when 
philosophers and theorists talk about the FAP hypothesis. He clarifies that the topic is 
designated by different terms, such as, famously, “film as philosophy”, but also “film-
philosophy”, “filmosophy” and “cinematic philosophy.”i However, although these terms 
are, in fact, used by different philosophers and theorists to defend the claim that films 
can philosophize, we should also note that their strength and details vary.  
Film-philosophy, for example, is a specific approach coined by Robert 
Sinnerbrink that defends cinema as a special medium to philosophize in specific ways, 
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which is a stronger position than those defended in mainstream Anglo-American 
philosophy of film. Sinnerbrink would perhaps be understood as defending an “extreme 
pro-cinematic philosophy” position. This is the kind of position that Wartenberg argues 
is defended by Stephen Mulhall in his work On Film, insofar as the British philosopher 
believes that film can philosophize “in just the ways that philosophers do,” including 
“serious and systematic thinking” about philosophical problems. ii Wartenberg considers 
himself to defend a moderate pro-position, focusing “upon specific techniques that 
filmmakers can employ to do philosophy on film, most centrally the thought 
experiment,” and asserting that the film medium can do philosophy along with other 
traditional media such as texts and oral discussions. But Wartenberg denies that all 
media can philosophize in the same ways, hence his moderate stance on the issue.iii   
 After clarifying what is meant by FAP and his moderate position, Wartenberg 
starts exposing and responding to four of the main objections to FAP. I will only 
consider the first objection, since it gets at the core of the issue. The first objection he 
examines is the “generality objection”. This objection “emphasizes the narrative 
character of fiction films in contrast to the universalistic aspirations of philosophy.” iv 
This objection is made, for example, by Bruce Russell in “The Philosophical Limits of 
Film.”v According to Russell, “no one can establish that something holds in all possible 
worlds by presenting an example or two of a possible world depicted in film.”vi 
Wartenberg here counter-argues that thought experiments used in philosophy are 
particular, non-universalist narratives. As an example of a cinematic thought 
experiment, Wartenberg refers to Bernardo Bertolucci’s The Conformist as a thought 
experiment to criticize Italian fascism.vii  
Indeed, this is the core of the discussion around this objection. If thought 
experiments are accepted as a common philosophical method, we can see how not all 
philosophical endeavors aim to establish necessary universal truths. Of course, thought 
experiments may have different functions, as Wartenberg highlights in Thinking on 
Screen (2007). One function thought experiments may have is to act as a 
counterexample to some general claim: even Bruce Russell agrees that films can do this, 
but he does not give enough weight to it.viii Further, we can pose the metaphilosophical 
question whether thought experiments are even good tools for philosophizing. This is 
not a question Wartenberg addresses here, but it points to one of the cruxes of the FAP 
discussion. This metaphilosophical question is pertinent; however, it involves a 
prescriptive metaphilosophy, i.e. a debate about what we should consider the best 
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philosophical tools. To defend FAP, I don’t think we need to get into this debate. 
Rather, we just need a descriptive metaphilosophy, i.e., a clarification of which 
metaphilosophies are traditionally, even conservatively, accepted. This is what I see as 
the main confusion that objectors to FAP make: they equate classificatory with 
qualitative criteria, and descriptive with prescriptive metaphilosophies. Even if we 
consider thought experiments as bad tools, they are still, in fact, used by contemporary 
philosophers. Cinematic thought experiments are just an extension of the media through 
which thought experiments can be conveyed.  
After dealing with several objections, Wartenberg explains that proponents of 
cinematic philosophy have to take a defensive position against all of them. He makes 
several positive assertions:  
1) films that are thought experiments can do philosophy;  
2) just because art can seek to entertain its audience doesn’t mean it cannot 
philosophize;  
3) it is not necessary to adopt a strong intentionalist account, just the use of 
creator-oriented interpretation; and 
4) it is possible for film to philosophize even if it is a joint work.  
For Wartenberg, the only way of knowing if a film does philosophy is by 
analyzing it.ix This is what he calls the “local” strategy.x In fact, he has been defending 
consistently the above mentioned 4 positive assertions, and the “local” strategy in his 
several papers and books since at least 2003.xi Wartenberg’s approach to FAP seems to 
be the right one. He defends against several objections and argues positively for film as 
philosophy. However, Wartenberg also disagrees with other advocates of cinematic 
philosophy since, for him, films cannot do everything that traditional means of 
philosophizing can. Using formal logic as an example of something film cannot do, he 
argues that “making overly strong claims for cinematic philosophy only renders the case 
for its existence problematic.”xii Because the objections seem to fail, Wartenberg states 
that films can do philosophy via thought experiments and illustrations of philosophical 
theses, and by offering “novel philosophical insight.”xiii 
 Wartenberg’s chapter is a comprehensive introduction to the main arguments 
against FAP and some possible replies. It summarizes the origins of the debate, its 
positions, from extreme to moderate, and points to the core problems of FAP. As this 
chapter is a kind of introduction to the debate, I suggest reading the primary 
bibliography to further understand the details and lines of argument. Wartenberg’s 
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position, nonetheless, may be seen as too conservative, especially when compared to 
Sinnerbrink’s film-philosophy approach. Indeed, Wartenberg can be seen as being too 
committed to “very specific techniques” of philosophy as he, himself, admits.xiv On the 
one hand, this can be seen as a strategic move in order to convince as many 
philosophers as he can, thus opening a broader acceptance by the most conservative 
philosophers of the idea that films may be new means through which one can 
philosophize. But, on the other hand, this may be viewed as too restrictive, and it may 
not respond completely to what Livingston terms as the “rationality objection.” With 
Hegelian inspiration, Livingston asks “If we in fact believe a more efficient means to 
our goal is available, would it not indeed be irrational to pass it by?”xv So, if film is 
constantly compared against traditional philosophical means, this may be a lost cause. If 
we can rely on texts to philosophize, why even bother considering other means?  
Wartenberg hints towards an answer to this challenge by admitting that films 
have abilities texts do not. He claims that “film is both a visual and temporally extended 
artform [that] gives it an immediacy that is greater than other artforms in its presentation 
of philosophy.”xvi This may not seem very concrete, but if we consider Wartenberg’s 
analysis of The Matrix in Thinking on Screen, we can better understand how this can 
philosophize in ways that are prompted by cinema’s nature that cannot be done in 
texts.xvii So, maybe the challenge here should be that Wartenberg and philosophers who 
may defend this moderate version of a pro-FAP thesis, ought to  present more 
compelling examples of films that make use of their specific techniques that turn them 
possibly better ways, in some sense, to philosophize, than other more traditional means. 
Chapter 10, written by Murray Smith, has a very telling title: “Film, Philosophy, 
and the Varieties of Artistic Value.” It presents the opposing view to Wartenberg’s.  
Smith begins with an Arthur Danto passage: “Like persons, works of art are a 
great deal richer than philosophy can or should want to capture.”xviii This already points 
to something about Smith’s thesis: he uses this phrase to put art on a pedestal, which is, 
according to Danto himself, a way to philosophically disenfranchise art.xix That is the 
strategy Smith adopts to refute FAP: try to show the incompatibility between art’s and 
philosophy’s ends. 
Smith asks the crucial question “according to what conception of ‘philosophy’ 
can these films be said to be ‘doing’ philosophy?” Immediately, he charges FAP 
advocates of not meeting the “norms of philosophy” because films, indeed, are not 
works of philosophy.xx For Smith, differences between philosophy, the sciences, and the 
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arts are not accidental. However, he admits that this “division of labor” has been 
questioned, giving the example of Edouard Machery’s experimental philosophy as 
blurring the lines between philosophy and science. Thus, Smith wonders if we can also 
question the “division of labor” between philosophy and film.  Here he cites Paisley 
Livingston’s famous list to think about this question:  
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations  
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations  
W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object  
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice  
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions  
Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity  
Frank Capra, It Happened One Night  
Lily and Lana Wachowski, The Matrix.xxi 
 
What Smith wants to suggest here, with Livingston, is that we find it strange to 
see the last two titles on this list, since films are not regarded as works of philosophy. 
“[W]e do not customarily treat filmmakers – let alone Hollywood filmmakers – as 
philosophers,” according to Smith.xxii It looks like, for Smith, Hollywood filmmakers 
are excluded a priori from any possibility of counting as philosophy. But Smith does 
not provide any argument for this view. As many philosophers harbor a Platonic 
prejudice against arts in general, here we find a prejudice against Hollywood 
filmmakers in particular. 
 Smith also refers here to Cleanth Brook’s “Heresy of Paraphrase,” according to 
which we should not put art into competition with science, philosophy or theology.xxiii 
Thus, for Smith, “while philosophy seeks to clarify our understanding of the world, the 
vocation of art is to deliver an adventure in perception, cognition, and emotion.”xxiv 
Here he poses the traditional idea that philosophy is absolutely committed to epistemic 
goals, and that we evaluate philosophical theories solely by their arguments and ideas, 
not their beauty.  
 Knowing that this argument denies FAP, Smith agrees with Wartenberg that we 
should avoid the “easy solution,” adding that to defend FAP we need “i) a suitable, 
ambitious and complete conception of philosophy as a practice (rather than an attitude 
or stance), and ii) the execution of which practice is solicited by the design of a film.”xxv  
 Thus, Smith designates what he thinks to be three “norms of philosophy” for 
robust philosophizing, or “regulating ideals” to achieve philosophy’s epistemic aims:  
1) rational warrant: philosophy’s “attention to the rational – or non-rational or 
irrational […] underpinning of our beliefs and practices.” The rational 
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assessment of these underpinning is done, according to Smith, through the 
tools of logic; 
2) empirical support/soundness: we should also take into account the empirical 
evidence at our disposal; 
3) reflective maturity: inspired by Rawls’ reflective equilibrium, according to 
Smith the philosophical conclusion we reach should be “the product of a 
sustained process of reflection, of testing our beliefs and assumptions by 
examining them from a multitude of angles.”xxvi   
Given these “norms of philosophy”, Smith believes that philosophy is more 
demanding than science: it is regulated by norms that go beyond empirical evidence. 
 Smith here addresses one criticism posed against his argument: that his view of 
philosophy is “too parochial, too narrowly bound to an analytic conception of 
philosophy.”xxvii He replies that these norms are inspired by Socratic dialogue and refers 
to Hegel as a non-analytic philosopher for whom it would be irrational to use art for 
epistemic ends when we already have philosophy. This is the “rationality objection” 
Livingston derives from Hegel.xxviii Smith does not, however, address Livingston’s own 
reply to this objection that we are not in the position of having to choose between doing 
philosophy through traditional media or through other artistic media—we can use 
both.xxix Wartenberg is also sympathetic to this claim.  
Nevertheless, Smith’s reference to Socrates and Hegel do not seem to put the 
criticism of having a narrow and analytic conception of philosophy to rest. Philosophers 
from different schools or approaches can share the same ideas, varying only on their 
methods or styles, so it is not surprising that we find the same ideas in philosophers as 
different as G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Danto, or Bertrand Russell. Furthermore, even if 
Hegel thought that art should not be used to epistemic ends, Smith did not say how 
Hegel’s or Socrates’ philosophy was regulated by these norms. This seems to be an 
appeal to authority that isn’t very accurate nor supported by a strong argument. 
The “too narrow of a conception of philosophy” objection to Smith seems to 
remain a fair criticism. These norms of philosophy are, at best, not norms, but general 
illuminating principles for a good philosophy practice and, at worst, a misunderstanding 
of how philosophy has been done during millennia, imposing an analytic, western-
centric XX century type of philosophizing. For example, according to Noël Carroll, 
“Smith’s argument against movie-made philosophy on the basis of ambiguity is not 
conclusive, because at best he is dealing with tendencies.”xxx The same criticism applies 
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to this chapter: Smith seems to be committed to controversial conceptions of philosophy 
and art. 
 However, Smith goes on to argue that art is not as concerned with cognitive 
value, even if art isn’t cognitively trivial, as Jerome Stolnitz thought.xxxi Art has, 
according to Smith, a plurality of values that do not reduce to cognitive ones. This 
seems to be a less contentious point, yet it seems to contradict his thesis. If art can also 
have cognitive values and purposes, why should we maintain that films cannot have any 
relevant philosophical value? It still is not clear why we would have to “reduce” a work 
of film to its epistemological potentials in order to accept FAP. For example, according 
to Wartenberg, Modern Times is an example of a film that has philosophical value, but 
it doesn’t mean its comedic value is reduced. Quite the opposite, it is the philosophical 
content of certain film scenes that make them comical.xxxii 
 To better understand how art and, particularly film, contrasts with philosophy in 
the level of concern with cognitive value, Smith refers, again, Danto’s thought on the 
relationship between art and philosophy. Danto’s Hegelian view of contemporary art is, 
generally, that art reached a great level of self-consciousness, as are examples such as 
the works of Duchamp and Warhol, regarded as philosophical works. Thus, Smith 
thinks that avant-garde films may be good candidates of self-conscious filmmaking, as 
self-reflective art. However, Smith wants to address films that are outside this tradition, 
since mainstream films are usually the objects of focus by philosophers who argue for 
FAP.xxxiii  
 The first film he explores is Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982). According to 
Smith, the film “dramatizes a trio of ‘existential-ethical’ concerns:” “the limits of self-
knowledge”, “the subordination of a class of agents with the same capacities as the 
subordinating class”; and “the condition of living in the shadow of imminent and 
premature death.”xxxiv The point Smith wants to stress is that this film, as a fictional 
narrative, does not offer any empirical support and is not submitted to rational 
examination for such philosophical ideas being, thus, unable to achieve reflective 
maturity. This seems to point to the idea that such film does not fulfil the norms of 
philosophy. Furthermore, for Smith, asking a fictional film to fulfil such norms would 
be an “absurd demand.” What he proposes is that we analyze the “film’s sensuous 
embodiment of its ideas to locate the source of its value,” explaining that with 
“sensuous” he means the “various levels of response and appreciation (…) from bodily 
reflexes to imaginative reflection.”xxxv  
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Another point to reiterate is that something having a primary goal does not 
impede it from having a secondary and still valid goal. In this case, it is possible that 
Blade Runner is primarily concerned with making an artistic film and, secondarily, a 
philosophical one.  
 Smith gives another example of a film that has been getting philosophers’ 
attention:xxxvi the documentary The Act of Killing (2012) by Joshua Oppenheimer. 
According to Smith, even though this documentary has ethico-political value, since it 
“raises ethical questions,” it does not probe “the evidence presented from numerous 
angles, offering counterexamples and counterarguments” and, thus, is not able to 
establish reflective maturity. Again, this film fails to fulfill all three norms of 
philosophy. On the other hand, for Smith The Act of Killing does, indeed, present 
critical and ethical claims through its aesthetic experience and its set of norms as a work 
of art that is not the same as the set norms for philosophy. 
 In “Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity” (2006), Smith also made an argument 
that follows this strategy of analyzing particular potential philosophical film. There, he 
examined Carl Reiner’s All of Me (1984) to contrast it with what appears to be a kind of 
similar philosophical thought experiment – Bernard Williams’ thought experiment on 
personal identity. In “Personal Identity and Individuation” Williams puts the hypothesis 
of a magician that makes a trick where he puts the emperor’s mind into a peasant’s 
body, and vice-versa.xxxvii Williams’ goal was to show how, even being possible to 
conceive a body switch (as Locke conceives), that would imply various problems, 
which suggests that the Lockean perspective on personal identity is problematic. Smith 
states that this thought experiment, although having a comical potential, has a primarily 
epistemic role.xxxviii In All of Me, there is also a body switching from a woman’s mind to 
a man’s body, resulting in comedic narrative and visuals. According to Smith, the main 
goal of All of Me, contrary to Williams’ thought experiments, is primarily comical.  
 The particular argument that Smith makes in these three cases is slightly 
different. With Blade Runner, he aims to show that this film does not give sufficient 
empirical support to a certain philosophical thesis, nor it is submitted to rational 
examination, thus being unable to achieve reflective maturity. With The Act of Killing, 
the documentary does not achieve reflective maturity either since it does not show us 
the evidence from various points of view, nor does it offer counterexamples or counter-
arguments. And All of Me’s main goal is not philosophical but comedic, which shows 
that film’s priority is not epistemic, but aesthetic.  
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 Smith’s strategy seems to consist of giving examples of films that could have 
philosophical potential, and then trying to demonstrate how they cannot, in fact, 
philosophize. But why should we think that a few examples (of films that may not even 
be the best candidates for FAP) should convince us of the general conclusion that no 
film can philosophize? Of course, this is a consequence of Smith’s a priori thesis that 
no film can ever philosophize. But why take so much space of the article trying to show 
examples of that? If it is an a priori issue, no example is required to confirm it, let alone 
many examples. Nonetheless, Smith’s strategy here may be this: as Blade Runner and 
The Act of Killing have been consistently considered, by philosophers, as good 
examples of cinematic philosophy, if he can prove that neither of these strong 
candidates of FAP actually philosophizes, other weaker candidate films do not 
philosophize either. This could be a viable strategy, however, it still seems a bit strange 
to try convincing advocates for FAP that no film can philosophize on the basis of 
analysis of just two cases. 
 In the final part of the chapter, Smith summarizes his thesis. He claims that his 
argument is not eliminativist, but deflationary. He concedes that art can have cognitive 
value, but not in a philosophical manner.xxxix He also makes two important concessions: 
films can “be appropriated for philosophical purposes” and that we could “accept that 
there is an area of overlap between the domains of art and philosophy”, even conceding 
that Wartenberg’s example of the documentary Ways of Seeing may occupy such an 
area.xl But doesn’t this contradict his previous positions? What does he mean by this 
area of overlap? Smith even states that “there seems to be no impediment in principle to 
the use of the techniques of cinema […] for philosophical purposes, and even meeting 
the exacting demands of rational warrant, empirical adequacy, and reflective 
maturity.”xli 
 He finishes the chapter with Danto, stating that “Danto seems at pains to 
emphasize that philosophy and literature should not be wholly or simply identified with 
one another, no matter how significantly they overlap.”xlii But again, Wartenberg, for 
example, never argues that film and philosophy should be equated.  
 Overall, this chapter seems to fall into the trap of confusing the two kinds of 
metaphilosophies that I previously mentioned. I also worry Smith holds aesthetic 
assumptions that may not be very plausible, such as the idea that art tends to be 
ambiguous.  
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This chapter’s argument is a bit different from his previous argument in “Film 
Art, Argument, and Ambiguity.” His previous argument was more directed at the 
explicitness vs. ambiguity issue, while in this chapter he raises the issue of fulfilling the 
“norms of philosophy,” which are contentious. Are we supposed to find every norm met 
in every single philosophy paper, for instance? Maybe we should question whether all 
philosophical production, in fact, meets those norms.  
Nonetheless, Smith makes an honorable and very interesting effort to clarify his 
metaphilosophy here, which is a positive evolution from his previous article on the 
issue, and an advance over other opponents of FAP. Smith still does fairly represent, in 
my view, the opposition to FAP with arguments that extend beyond film, and that could 
even be applied to other pretensions of defending philosophy through any art form. 
However, as he concedes, his metaphilosophy does not definitively refute FAP. So, I 
see the debate around FAP as a debate around presupposed metaphilosophical 
conceptions, and Smith’s clarification of this aspect of the debate seems, to me, the 
exact point of contention and the correct observation to make. 
 
Both chapters I’ve discussed here are quite different. Wartenberg’s chapter 
serves as an overall introduction to the topic and to his ideas; it is a guide to 
understanding FAP. Smith’s chapter, on the other hand, presents a new argument 
against FAP, although his conclusion is not as opposed to FAP as one might expect. 
Note that Wartenberg does not develop his own arguments as much since he addresses 
various arguments and objections. With Smith’s concessions by the end of his chapter, I 
don’t know if he is becoming increasingly receptive to FAP. After all, Smith is, or was, 
one, if not the, major opponent to FAP in the literature. Surely, his arguments in this 
chapter are controversial, so we can expect some reply and the further extension of the 
debate. To conclude, this section of Current Controversies in Philosophy of Film is a 
combination of a great introduction to the idea of film as philosophy and a new 
perspective on the existing debate. Combined these chapters contain all the source 
materials to introduce this issue to philosophy and films studies courses and start 
various debates on film’s abilities or limits. As these chapters touch on 
metaphilosophical subjects too, and on new means to philosophize, these may be also 
used to more advanced philosophical courses on metaphilosophy and philosophical 
methodology. 
DIANNA NEIVA 
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